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Abstract
Computer networking often pushes the limit of available bandwidth. Al-
though bandwidth speed has historically increased 10 fold in recent years,
reusing existing materials to achieve comparable results to installing new in-
frastructure is typically preferred. Moreover, the failure of one high speed link
results in a significant drop in a network’s instantaneous bandwidth. Band-
width aggregation allows for the combining of multiple network links into one
logical interface with the combined bandwidth of the supporting links. This
comes with the benefit of fail over redundancy, allowing the network to adapt
and recover from link failures. This has been achieved at the lowest 3 layers
of the OSI model, with both proprietary and open software solutions in ex-
istence that get the job done.But it has yet to become pervasive in growing
WiFi and WAN networks. Implementations at this level have been proposed
(such as Multipath TCP), only a fraction of which are realizable by the typical
consumer, due to the slow adoption speed of emerging aggregation protocols.
This MQP proposes a new method for bandwidth aggregation, utilize-able
by the typical home network owner. The methods explained herein aggregate
a network of coordinating routers within local WiFi communication range to
achieve increased bandwidth at the application layer, over the HTTP pro-
tocol. Our protocol guarantees content delivery and reliability, as well as
non-repudiation measures that hold each participant, rather then the group
of routers, accountable for the content they download.
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1 Introduction
An influx of bandwidth intensive services over the past decade has placed an in-
creased demand for high speed connections on the shoulders of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs). However, the demand is overwhelming to the typical ISP, which
has to enforce a fair and steady bandwidth between each subscriber in order to keep
the network healthy. It is now common place that ISPs apply traffic shaping rules,
in order to enforce an upper limit on bandwidth alloted to each client. Cellular
service providers, who employ long distance wireless communication channels (such
as LTE) to guarantee Internet coverage to mobile clients, rate limit their clients for
the same reasons.
In urban areas, clients (both mobile users and home owners) are naturally in
close proximity. One can imagine the number of mobile devices crowded together at
a busy bus stop, or the overlap of routers (each with a separate ISP subscription)
within wireless communication range of each other in a city apartment. Combining
these rate-limited neighboring devices can yield download speeds that comes close to
the true sum of the parts. This very idea is enticing to the networking community.
This has lead to a surge of academic works which empirically guarantee bandwidth
aggregation at various layers of the OSI model. However, very few are found in
practice today, and even fewer are practical to the consumer. A great number
of works have focused on aggregating the bandwidth of LTE users into altruistic
communities, which offer higher bandwidth then that of an individual link. However,
in the apartment setting, only a limited number of commercial offerings have been
devised. This MQP seeks to contribute to the latter case.
Existing bandwidth aggregating solutions available to consumers have two short-
comings. Their functioning requires the presence of a special router (for each client),
and they fail to provide strong security guarantees. Our approach leverages the
HTTP protocol in order to aggregate bandwidth between a number of routers, called
peers, in local wireless range of each other. This means that our solution is inher-
ently protocol dependent. However, since web traffic is carried across HTTP, it is
prevalent enough for most use cases. It can be run on any Linux platform (such as
the DD-WRT router firmware), making home installation an achievable reality. Our
solution comes in the form of an HTTP proxy server, targeted to run on a router,
which acts as an intermediary between the client and the router its self. It can be
thought of as the brain behind the aggregation schema, letting the router handle the
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transport of all traffic without having to worry about the mechanisms being used for
aggregation. Further, it safeguards participants from being incriminated for traffic
they unwillingly download on behalf of other peers, through strict enforcement of
non-repudiation. This guarantees that participants in a proxy community can not
be held accountable for traffic they ferry on behalf of neighboring participants.
Our bandwidth aggregation protocol was implemented in Python, and tested on
both real and virtualized hardware, with the majority of our data coming from the
controlled virtualized environment. We found that the bandwidth realized by the
client is close to that of the summed bandwidth of each involved router.
The report is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an extensive overview
of the current bandwidth aggregation client, beginning with its inception in the
late 1990s, up to the modern trends of the past decade. Our initial approach to
implementing the proxy, and explanation of our design rationale is given in section
3. Detailed results of our evaluations, and an overview of the process, can be found in
section 4. Discussion on the various cryptographic primitives and security protocols
adapted for use in this proxy, such as non-repudiation, trust factors, and signature
verification using a public key infrastructure, can be found in section 5. Related
works, and suggested areas for future improvements to our approach, can be found
in section 6.
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2 Background
The practice of link aggregation was first defined in the 802.3-2000 IEEE standard.
It came as a continuation of the work started by a task force that the 802 group
assembled on November of 1997, to address the then disparate trend of link ag-
gregation [1]. They recognized the ubiquity of Ethernet, and that several vendors
already had solutions for aggregating existing physical links to provide a faster Eth-
ernet connection. However, an inter-operable solution was desired. The protocol
they developed became known as the “Link Aggregation Control Protocol”(LACP),
officially as 802.3ad, but later moved to 802.1ax. LACP provides a reliable mecha-
nism for aggregating Ethernet links which implement the same protocol. It allows
for the controlled addition and removal of links from an aggregation group without
disrupting the stream of data frames [2].
One of the core principles behind link aggregation, and this MQP, is cost. Up-
grading to a higher speed link is always an option, but trunking together multiple
existing lower speed links can satisfy most, if not all, of the same needs. This also
provides resilience, since a failure of one link just means a decrease in through-
put, instead of a total loss, as LACP will automatically load balance between the
remaining available links. LACP works well for enterprise network operators who
have access to the necessary physical links and switches, but has a few short com-
ings. LACP is inherently targeted for neighboring physical connections, which can
only be combined through use of additional hardware (namely, a switch). These
shortcoming would become more apparent as demand for high bandwidth wireless
LAN and WWAN grew.
2.1 Heterogeneous Wireless Networks
With the surging popularity of video streaming, high definition media, and online
gaming, bandwidth limits have again become a problem for residential addresses.
Multinode terminal devices (such as smart phones) have the power to actively switch
between Radio Access Technologies (RATs), but few actively use this technique.
Aggregating several RATs, such as LTE and WiFi, would give these devices better
fail over redundancy and increased bandwidth.
Ramaboli et al. present a comprehensive review of the current climate of band-
width aggregation in heterogeneous wireless networks [3]. They identify a number
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of common concerns that various bandwidth aggregation techniques must address
in order to be proficient. Amongst these issues is packet reordering, which becomes
necessary in any situation when items are delivered out of order. This results from
the inherent invariability of link conditions within the Internet. Any response that
travels over different paths will each be subject to differing latencies and delays. It
is an unavoidable consequence of aggregating two separate streams. This introduces
a buffer overhead into the session, which must be absolved by the client, server, or
any intermediary hops along the way (depending on the architecture of the partic-
ular approach). The second issue, battery power, becomes more of an issue on free
roaming mobile devices which aren’t constantly tethered to a power source. This
MQP effectively sidesteps this battery power issue by performing all aggregation
logic on a persistently powered device.
A tenet of successful bandwidth aggregation is the preservation of packet order.
Combining multiple RATs can yield throughput equivalent to the sum of the indi-
vidual lines. This helps reduce load on a particular link by evenly distributing it
over many links, so long as the distribution order preserves packet order. Packet
reordering does not just bloat buffer space, or slow down reassembly at the client
end. Packet reordering outside a certain sequence range will trigger a TCP loss
event, which shrinks the transmission window and negatively affects throughput,
leading to an underutilization of the aggregate bandwidth capacity [3].
Jayasumana et al. suggest a set of metrics to help evaluate packet reordering,
these are Reorder Density (RD) and Reorder Buffer-occupancy Density (RBD). Re-
order Density describes the distribution of out of order packets (normalized to the
number of packets) for any given sequence. Reorder Buffer-occupancy Density mea-
sures the buffer occupancy frequencies normalized to the number of non duplicate
packets. This metric can be good for predicting the amount of resources required
to perform packet reordering [4].
Ramaboli et al. conclude that all wireless bandwidth aggregation techniques can
be pigeonholed into one of two slots, based on how they attempt to circumvent the
need for packet reordering. Adaptive bandwidth aggregation observes various link
conditions in order to smartly route packets of varying size between interfaces. This
would obviously be the preferred method, as it lowers the chances of out of order
delivery. Non-adaptive bandwidth aggregation uses static link selection (such as
round robin) in order to route sub-flows. This can lead to lower throughput when
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link and traffic conditions are not constant (as a result of factors such as jitter) [3].
Bandwidth aggregation has been realized on all network layers except the phys-
ical. The numerous methods at each layer vary significantly in their levels of trans-
parency, administrative overhead, and infrastructure leverage. Each must implement
two basic methods: one to divide traffic over multiple links and one to reassemble
the traffic.
2.2 Application Layer
Solutions for bandwidth aggregation at the application layer have access to multi-
ple outgoing interfaces, and can split the data into several application layer chunks
(as this MQP does with HTTP) which can then be transmitted simultaneously
over these interfaces. However, the aggregation must be application-specific, and
does not provide more general, application agnostic aggregation. Examples include
XFTP, MuniSockets and parallel sockets. XFTP and Parallel Sockets both main-
tain multiple TCP connections over a single interface to any number of distributed
servers [3]. Multiple TCP protocols ( [5], [6]) leverage the idea of parallel sockets for
downloading file portions from distributed servers. This technique alleviates load on
a target server, by spreading requests out to multiple servers (who are assumed to
have the same requested resource). They achieve similar goals to bandwidth aggre-
gation by providing failover redundancy, recovering from server failure by migrating
the remainder of the download to another target. Note that while these methods
do not aggregate multiple network interfaces, they do share some common ground
with this MQP through their technique of parallel segmented downloading.
Mohamed et al. propose Multiple Network Interface Sockets (MuniSockets), a
protocol which performs true aggregation of multiple physical interfaces, maintaining
a separate thread for each connection, on both the client and server end. A counter
is used to compute sequence numbers for each data chunk. Each chunk awaits a
vacancy in the send buffer before it is sent out. Naturally, chunks may arrive out of
order at the receiver. MuniSockets holds these chunks in a reorder buffer until they
can be properly spliced into the data passed back to the client. It uses selective
acknowledgments (in a vain similar to that of TCP) to deal with retransmissions.
Unfortunately, it assumes static, unchanging network conditions, and thus does not
respond to jitter or delays [7].
As application layer solutions isolate modifications to the most infrastructure
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independent layer, they are more realizable in the short term. Although modification
at the client and server is a demanding requirement of application layer solutions,
they are available to end users who are motivated to upgrade. Solutions at other
layers tend to require infrastructure changes on a far wider scale. Due to the ossified
nature of the Internet, realizing most lower layer solutions on a wide scale is an
ambitious and difficult endeavor.
2.2.1 Transport Layer
Transport layer bandwidth aggregation solutions come with an array of benefits.
They provide path transparent congestion control, work transparently between the
application and network layers, and have experienced a surge in research over the
past decade [8]. However, TCP is not inherently optimized for timely delivery,
so using it as a mechanism for aggregation only provides so much gain. Popular
streaming services, which are fairly bandwidth intensive, such as Netflix and Spotify,
use UDP and can not be remedied by TCP protocol modifications.
Multipath TCP (MTCP) has been defined by the IETF in 2011. It extends the
TCP protocol to support multi-homed endpoints (a multi-homed client has multiple
IP addresses). A Linux Kernel implementation of MPTCP has been developed and is
currently undergoing community experimentation, as its popularity grows [9]. Apple
caused a spike in interest in MPTCP by subtly building it into their iOS7 software.1
While it is only used for their Siri service in order to provide smooth Internet access
when one RAT unexpectedly cuts out, it represents the first commercial adoption
of the protocol.
Multipath TCP works by breaking outgoing data from the application layer into
multiple streams that can travel out different interfaces. The MPTCP stack on the
host communicates each available peer address at its disposal to the server, with each
address denoting a unidirectional path to the instance. It also handles separating
each TCP subflow out and gluing returning data from these flows back together, so
they can be delivered to the application. Across the network, these subflows are just
typical TCP connections, which are handled by each hop as they would normally.
This transparency enables MPTCP to work in any situation which traditional TCP
would have worked [10].
1Their technical documentation does not advertise their use of MPTCP, but WireShark captures
reveal that iOS7 sends MPTCP specific requests under certain use cases.
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Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), has multi-homing support build
in. By default, it only uses one stream (the primary path) per transport direction,
instead of one stream for both (as in TCP). All other available streams are used
when the primary path fails. The collection of SCTP streams are denoted as an As-
sociation, and data packets sent over them are divided into chunks, which may be
delivered out of order. The SCTP stack on the end hosts then handles reordering of
these packets. SCTP [8] enforces a congestion control window similar to TCP’s over
each path, and mimics many of TCP’s default functionality over each of its streams.
Although SCTP was not designed around multi-homing specifically, it provides a
framework for experimental work. Many SCTP variants achieve bandwidth aggrega-
tion, some of which are described in our overview of adaptive bandwidth aggregation
solutions.
2.2.2 Network Layer Solutions
Network layer bandwidth aggregation solutions provide transparency to upper lay-
ers. Unfortunately, they are prone to out of sequence arrivals, which must be handled
while consuming as little buffer space as possible.
The Round Robin packet scheduling algorithm, which runs in O(1) time, is
a simple preexisting network layer approach to bandwidth aggregation. Packets
(assumed to be of the same size) from the same flow are assigned to multiple paths
in a circular matter. The Round Robin scheduler only works so well in theory
because it assumes homogeneous packet size and transmission rate. However, this is
very rarely the case. In realistic scenarios, the round robin approach to scheduling
may limit the effective bandwidth to that of the slowest path [3].
Kim et al. (2008) proposed a bandwidth aggregation scheme which employs two
metrics for scheduling; bandwidth estimation and packet partition scheduling [11].
The former determines the amount of bytes that can safely be transmitted across a
link without triggering congestion. The latter decides how packets can be assigned to
different paths in order to effectively balance load. A partition counter is assigned to
each path, which is used to determine whether the associated path can accommodate
a new packet.
Evensen et al. introduce a method that uses network stripping, a process which
splits traffic over multiple different links, in order to aggregate bandwidth for multi-
homed clients [12]. In order to minimize reordering at the client, they employ a smart
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proxy to buffer out of order deliveries, and delegate packets to different interfaces.
The proxy acts as both a scheduler and delay equalizer. It decides which links to
send traffic through based off of observed throughput. The delay equalizer is used
to mitigate client side reordering, by delaying packet retransmission.
2.2.3 Data link Layer
The data link layer was where earlier solutions to bandwidth aggregation lived. It
was not until the mobile network boom that attempts to aggregate heterogeneous
RATs at the link layer began again. One such realization of this practice is the
Generic Link Layer (GLL) protocol. GLL is a multi access radio architecture that
aims to unite differing RATs under a transparent session. GLL allows for Multi
Radio Transmission Diversity.
MRTD is defined as the data flow split (on IP or MAC PDU level) be-
tween two communicating entities over more than one RAT. This com-
prises parallel transmission, or dynamic switching between the available
RATs [13].
MRTD can select its links based off criteria such as traffic requirements and esti-
mated link quality. However, like many others, this approach to bandwidth aggre-
gation struggles with the issues of packet reordering and unbalanced load distribu-
tion [3].
2.3 Adaptive bandwidth aggregation
The pitfalls of the na¨ıve approach (non-adaptive bandwidth aggregation) manifest
themselves at every layer. Static decision making for link selection ultimately lead
to out of order delivery of differing data segments, which must then be addressed by
packet reordering. Adaptive bandwidth aggregation considers the varying link and
traffic conditions when organizing sub-flows between multiple interfaces. A variety
of these approaches exist, of which Ramboli et al. provide an excellent overview.
At the application layer, Luo et al. [14] split traffic into important and non-
important stream, delivering each stream over a different RAT. Protocols such as
HTTP, which mix important main page objects with unimportant inline objects
(such as photos and advertisements), benefit greatly from this dissection. A small
training packet is sent along each link to calculate the RTT and delays, this is
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done intermittently and allows their implementation to better split traffic between
different links. Splitting traffic into streams is often done with video content, where
a base layer (necessary for decoding the video) is separated from different high level
enhancement layers, which enrich viewing of the video. Each of these streams are
sent over different channels, with the lower layers (starting with the base layer)
receiving higher priority. Here, the base layer is assigned to the most reliable path,
ensuing layers are assigned to the remaining available paths based on their priorities
[15].
Multimedia data transfer over multiple access channels was explored by Kasper
et. al, in an attempt to asses the improvements to video-on-demand playback given
by bandwidth aggregation. They note that startup latency (the waiting time before
the video can begin) and large buffer overheads are amongst the greatest challenges
in progressive downloading over multiple channels. Accordingly, segment size plays
a key role in determining the extent of these challenges. The larger the segment
size, the bigger the buffer requirements. They identify that the number of network
interfaces used as part of aggregation also increase the buffer requirement. This
leads to an issue of algorithmically determining the optimal segment size, in order
to minimize startup latency and buffer requirements [16].
W-SCTP, an extension of the stream control protocol, uses a bandwidth aware
scheduler (implemented on the sending end) to manage subflows across multiple
paths [Casetti and Gaiotto (2004)]. It maintains separate send buffers per interface,
and sends each segment down the fastest one until each path has reached its con-
gestion window limit. This approach does not deal with segment reordering, and
fails to use the vast majority of metrics for optimal link selection.
Also see LS-SCTP, which achieves one logical congestion window made up of
the aggregate of the participating paths. Flow control is separated from congestion
control, allowing each path to have its own congestion window, while flow control
logic happens by association with the session. Data is divided into chunks and
assigned to the best path based on continuously measured channel statistics (such
as bandwidth). The congestion window is closely monitored in order to determine
which path to send a particular chunk across [17].
Arrival time matching load balancing (ATLB) [18], presents a solution to the or-
dering problem. ATLB scores each path by end-to-end delay, and uses this heuristic
(lower is better) to assign each segment to a path. This significantly cuts down on
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out of order delivery, but a reorder buffer at the client must be maintained to deal
with infrequent reordering issues.
2.4 Mobile Devices as an Aggregation Platform
Multi-homed mobile devices (most prominently smart phones) offer a low hanging
opportunity for bandwidth aggregation. With the typical person carrying one ac-
tive mobile device on them at all times, the potential to treat each device as a
hand held router opens up an exciting array of possibilities for intelligent and dy-
namic bandwidth aggregation. Typically, a bandwidth pool between client devices
is achieved through inverse multiplexing. The challenges of this set up come from
the ephemeral nature of the participating community members. A mobile user may
enter a bus with dozens of other users, where a community may or may not already
exist. Another user may exit at the next stop, and the community would have to
adapt to the sudden loss.
Sharma et al. simulate these ideas in order to justify future research in collab-
orative bandwidth aggregation for mobile systems. They devise a system in which
mobile peers dynamically form ad hoc Mobile Collaborative Communities, in which
each member creates a communication channel to the inverse multiplexer (opti-
mally a proxy), which can then be used (partially or in full) by other members of
the community. The summation of these channels can be logically combined by
an inverse multiplexing protocol in order to offer one logical high speed aggregate
channel [15]. Their simulations show that bandwidth increases linearly with each
added participant to the pool [15].
2.5 Non-Repudiation and Willingness to Participate
Sharma et al. pose the question: do mobile users desire to share their personal
communication channels (in a utilitarian fashion)? Once the question of how to
aggregate has been solved, the end user still has to agree to participate. This is
especially the case when aggregation hinges on the participation of a client’s own
device (such as a mobile phone, laptop, or router). Fortunately, user bandwidth is
low cost, and users can volunteer as little as they desire. A good protocol should
prioritize individual user experience, so that one peer can never interfere with the
quality of service of another peer. [15] Optimistically looks at the the success of peer
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to peer services, inferring that users who are willing to share their data will also be
readily willing to share their communication resources. However, there is one final
concern that users should not have to worry about: accountability. There must be
a system in place to ensure that a peer cannot be prosecuted for blindly passing
along malicious or illegal traffic that enters the pool.
Non-repudiation allows us to provide this guarantee. It facilitates liability and
thus self accountability through a guarantee of indeniability for any particular in-
teraction. This can be more clearly illustrated through a message exchange between
Alice and Bob, a quintessential cryptographic metaphor for a sender / receiver. If
Alice sends a message to Bob, who receives it, neither Alice or Bob should be able
to deny their transmission or receipt of the message (respectively). This introduces
the notion of fairness to non-repudiation. In our example, Alice would maintain
a non-repudiation of origin record (proving that she was in fact the sender), and
Bob would hold a non-repudiation of receipt record (proving that he did indeed
receive the message). This essentially guarantees that one party cannot deceive the
other [19].
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3 Approach
A detailed assessment and overview of the optimal design for an HTTP bandwidth
aggregating proxy is given in the proceeding section. We implemented a proof of
concept python implementation, that has been stripped of some of the auxiliary
features described herein, but serves as a foundation which could be extended to
accomplish all of them.
3.1 Core Design Components
Here, we decouple the design logic from our software, in order to emphasize the
important factors which were considered while developing the proxy. These not
only include the questions of how to perform aggregation, but when to aggregate in
the first place.
3.1.1 Determining when to aggregate
Certainly, not all Internet traffic merits bandwidth aggregation. A typical web
request, be it for a JavaScript library or page markup, rarely exceeds the double
digit range in kilobytes. The small overhead given by the inter-router communication
needed for our protocol outweighs the download time of the small packet. A na¨ıve
approach would be to find the response size for every packet, and judge based on
that. The HTTP protocol provides us with a way to do this, using the HEAD
method, which asks the server for only the headers (including content-length) of
the target resource. These requests are very small in size, but still suffer from an
end to end delay between the client and server. Since today’s web pages often
require dozens of resources to be fetched from various locations before a page can
be completely displayed, many HTTP HEAD requests would have to be made, on
top of the standard GET request (used to retrieve the data) in order to load a single
page. For a large number of small requests, the round trip delay of sending a HEAD
request for every packet introduces an unfavorable latency for typical web sessions.
Our solution was to issue all requests in a normal manner, without trying to
ascertain whether or not bandwidth aggregation was necessary before passing the
request to the server. When a response comes back, the content-length header is
always specified, which gives us a better clue of the size of the impending response.
If the dictated size is over a certain threshold, the connection is terminated and the
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same request is issued again, this time in the context of our bandwidth aggregation
scheme.
3.1.2 Negotiating Peer Involvement
Our protocol works by mustering a garrison of neighboring routers (neighboring
herein will be used interchangeably with peers, and will refer to network devices
within wireless range of each other who are capable of running our software) to
farm aggregation out to. In order for a peer to participate, it must be within
wireless signal range of the initiating router, where the connection between the two
is consistent and unlikely to cut out. This elicits the notion of reliability. The peer
must be capable of providing the services requested in a timely manner. Peers who
frequently timeout or drop requests mid session are considered to be unreliable. This
measure requires a good amount of auditing and record keeping to be done by each
router.
Optimally, each peer router would determine how much of it’s total bandwidth it
can commit to the session. If a download session would negatively effect the Quality
of Service the router provides to its own client, then it should opt out of the session.
The idea behind this is to maximize unused bandwidth, while still guaranteeing
the normal amount available to each individual router. Our implementation was
developed as a proof of concept, and does not support this bandwidth estimation
functionality. It is there fore left as a suggestion for future work.
3.1.3 Security and Liability
Our schema utilizes multiple neighboring routers to download differing sections of
the same resource. Further down the Internet pipe, an observer would perceive each
neighbor as requesting the same source. Therefore, any illegal traffic downloaded
using aggregation can potentially be traced back to the owners of each participating
router. This risk must be understood by each participating user. To combat this
concern, our protocol guarantees non-repudiation, eg. an aggregation session can
always be traced back to the originator. This is achieved using digital signatures for
each session, using a trusted third party, and is explained in further detail in our
discussion.
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3.1.4 Request Segmentation and Distribution
This MQP proposes two methods for request division and segmentation. The first
is an adaptive solution, which requires peers to keep track of their own bandwidth
utilization at any given time. When requesting peers for help in a download session,
a peer will respond with the bandwidth they can offer at the time of the request. The
peer would then be given a localized chunk size that is derived from their advertised
bandwidth and the size of the file. In an ideal situation, each peer would finish their
section in a similar interval. The non adaptive solution assigns fixed size chunks to
each router in a round robin fashion, never delegating more then n chunks at a time
(to safeguard against buffer bloat) before the first chunk has been received and sent.
In this approach, chunk size quickly becomes an issue. The amount of buffer space
and memory on the device will play a key role in determining this. On embedded
devices, such as traditional routers, the buffer cannot be to big, due to the limited
memory typically available on these family of devices.
3.2 Deciding on a Device
Originally, we focused our methodology on adopting a single device to implement a
platform specific aggregation solution on. Later, we extended our implementation
to run on any network capable device which can run python.
We narrowed down the scope of our device search to three major families of
devices: routers, single-board computers, and traditional desktop computers running
Linux. The first of the single-board family is the Raspberry Pi. Small, cheap,
and robust, with a personalized flavor of Linux and support for just about any
framework desired, the Pi was an attractive choice. It can be modified to meet a
wide variety of needs, one of which includes emulating a router. The Pi can supports
a growing number of programming languages and boasts 2 GB of free disk space on
the cheapest model. However, with a limited number of outgoing ports (2 USB and
1 Ethernet), the quality of router this device could mimic is not favorable.
Second, a conventional Linux box could have been used. There is a large variety
of network purposed Linux distributions and debian derivatives of various capabil-
ities, which could be installed on any Linux platform. This could enable us to use
multiple network interfaces and a powerful CPU with plenty of memory, which could
perform well as router. This flexibility makes the combination of a robust distri-
bution and powerful hardware a difficult option to ignore. However, this heightens
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the deployment cost if an existing device was not available. Although the goal of
this project is to provide a proof of concept prototype for our model of bandwidth
aggregation, a cost effective implementation would be beneficial.
The third possibility was to use an existing wireless router and flash it with
open firmware that would allow it to be more easily altered. The configuration
options provided by a commercial router out of the box would not allow for low
level modification, and bandwidth aggregation cannot simply be achieved through
altering a few NAT tables, so firmware replacement was a necessity. Because of an
oversight of the GNU public license, Linksys developers were force to make their
WRT-54G drivers completely public in order to comply with the license. This
opened up the door for a variety of hacked WRT firmware variants to be developed,
eventually leading to DD-WRT. A large variety of common commercially available
routers can run this firmware.
DD-WRT is a popular implementation amongst do-it-yourself networking enthu-
siast. It provides a large amount of functionality not present on the original router
firmware, most of which is exposed in its configuration options. While the added
functionality was useful, we were more concerned with the ability to load and run
custom applications onto the router. For this, OpenWRT (a cousin of DD-WRT)
seemed like a better solution.
OpenWRT functions similar to DD-WRT, but it has more developer support and
a livelier community then that of the DD-WRT. It comes preloaded with a package
manager that makes installing custom software easy, which allows for the creation
of C/Python packages and even Kernel Modules. These add-ons can be flashed onto
the router as executables, or bundled with the original firmware image.
After reviewing all the device choices, we decided to use OpenWRT for the
project. Implementing router to router bandwidth aggregation on a router seemed to
be the most straightforward option. But as the project evolved, it became clear that
a router implementation was an end goal, the software which we were to write could
function better on a higher power Linux machine with multiple network interfaces
and plentiful amounts of memory and disk space. The goal was to implement a
software solution that was largely device independent, using an interpreted language
such as Python. This would allow end users to run the software on their choice of
Python capable hardware, be it a flashed router, Linux computer, or Raspberry Pi.
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3.3 First Design Iteration
After choosing to implement the project on routers flashed with OpenWRT, we
began to map out the technical implementation:
1 A daemon will run on each router, monitoring traffic coming through the
router, and deciding (based on some selection algorithm) whether or not to
perform bandwidth aggregation for the request.
2 The router will ask neighboring routers to participate in an aggregation session
for the specified request.
3 The initiating router will then divide the request into a number of chunks, and
distribute them to each neighbor.
4 Each neighbor will download the chunk, and forward the response data to the
initiating router, who will send it to the client.
Our first hurdle was to figure out how to make the routers exchange data to
and from the server, in a way that preserves the router’s credentials. For instance,
if router A sends a packet to router B that is meant for the server that the host
originally requested a file from, B would not know the address of the server, as B
only sees the source address from A, and the destination address as its own. We
quickly realized that encapsulation was needed.
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Figure 1: Initial plan for router to router communication, using encapsulation and
NAT.
Because the two routers need to exchange information freely, we would have to
open a TCP connection between both routers. This connection would be set up
when a router agreed to participate in an aggregation session. The initiating router
would then send request information (URL of server, the size of the file) to the
participating router, who would then issue its own request to the destination. The
participating router would then set up a mapping, perhaps using Network Address
Translation (NAT), to forward the responses it gets from the server back to the
initiating router, which would then deal with the data accordingly. Eventually, we
came to a model similar to this, in which neighboring routers relay response data
back to the initiating router.
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It became apparent that the core firmware of the router would have to be mod-
ified in order to achieve certain goals. Even the flexibility granted by Open-WRT
would not be sufficient to permit per packet inspection and decision making. The
issue was that we were trying to make routers do something outside of their original
purpose (to agnostically route packets). Per packet inspection, especially at the
application layer, is a task left better suited to a proxy server.
A proxy server acts as an intermediary agent between a client computer and
another server with which it wishes to communicate. We realized that running a
proxy server on each router would give us the authority to do as much as we wanted
with each packet going through the router. For this reason, we examined a number
of proxy solutions.
3.4 Squid proxy
Squid proxy, commonly refereed to as Squid Cache, is a caching proxy server for
Linux that supports a wide array of features. Its behaviors are entirely defined by
a configuration file that gives flexibility to the proxy. The default configuration fea-
tures include URL rewriting, request forwarding, dropping, and redirection, content
caching, and transparent proxying.
For the project to be implemented, the proxy would need to be able to inspect
a packet, create two new requests based on that packet’s headers, and split these
requests up between multiple TCP connections. However, since Squid’s capabilities
are strictly defined by the configuration file, if any functionality was not supported,
then Squid’s source code would have to be modified to accommodate.
Squid enables all of the standard proxying functions: URL rewriting, content
modification, request forwarding, and caching. However, splitting a single request
into multiple smaller requests, a necessity for the project, was not supported. This
left us with a choice to either modify the Squid source code, or find another solution.
After examining the source, we found that the code base was cluttered, and lacked
an active and excited community of contributors.
3.5 Proxying with Python
Python is a popular high level programming language with a standard library that
can accomplish both small and large scale needs. With the language’s focus on ease
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of use and readability, implementing a proxy from scratch was both achievable and
realistic under our time constraints.
Many simple Proxies have already been written in python. A convenient list is
maintained at: http://proxies.xhaus.com/python/. Most of these proxies extend
the httplib python library, which provides a simple interface for setting up stable
HTTP connections. Python also has a native socket library for TCP/UDP flows,
as well as a fair count of other choices for HTTP connections. These libraries range
in scale from pet project to proprietary endeavors, with their power and flexibility
reflecting the needs of the developers.
At the top of these offerings, lies a popularized and well maintained open source
framework, known as Twisted. The Twisted Web Framework is an event driven
networking framework for Python. It allows for a fully functioning HTTP proxy to
be created in less then 20 lines of code. Because Twisted is a programming frame-
work, defining new tools and custom functionality is a simple matter of extending
the existing tools and combining them in a useful way. The source was available
online, acting as a thorough set of documentation. It’s class hierarchy allows its
components to be extended and tweaked to suit any need. Twisted allowed us to
deploy a working prototype relatively quickly, in weeks instead of months.
3.6 Developing a Prototype
We started by writing a simple HTTP proxy server in Python using the Twisted web
framework. After installing the framework, writing a proxy that could perform basic
request logging was simple. This allows us the opportunity to hook into each request,
to determine if aggregation was necessary. This is when peer communication must
be initiated. For this to happen effectively, a clearly defined protocol for router-to-
router communication must be defined.
3.6.1 Peer communication protocol
The participants involved participants will not only exchange response data, but
record keeping and control information needed to keep each peer up to date as well.
We first considered a minimalist approach, in which the coordinating node queries
nearby peers with the URL of the server. If the peers accept, then the coordinator
would send requests to each peer continuously, asking for a different bit of the file
each time. When a peer had replied with that much data, the chunk was assumed to
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be delivered, and was passed to the client. This approach fails on a variety of levels.
What if the peer never finishes responding? How can the peer send control messages
and response data along the same pipe? These questions are best addressed by a
well defined peer communication protocol.
A request is broadcasted to neighboring peers by a coordinator who wishes to
begin an aggregation session with its constituents. This request contains all infor-
mation necessary for a peer to establish a connection to the desired resource. This
includes the URI, protocol, and port at a bare minimum. A peer should optimally
know the size of the file to be downloaded ahead of time, so it can estimate how
much time the session would require of it, and whether that would negatively im-
pact the QoS of its clients. Identification information, proving the source of the
request, must also be provided in the headers. This is achieved through asymmetric
cryptography by encrypting the URL and time stamp of the request with a private
key specific to each router. When a neighbor gets a request, they will attempt to
decrypt using that peer’s public key. If the decryption is invalid, then the peer is
either not a trusted neighbor, or has been spoofed.
An Accept/Decline message is sent by a peer who wishes to participate in a ses-
sion, or to be left out (respectively). For accept, the peer should include the original
URL, as well as a code indicating that they ACCEPT the session. An ACCEPT message
optionally responds with the instantaneous bandwidth that the peer can promise. A
DECLINE message responds with a reason, such as “too busy” or “unwilling to work
for untrusted peer”, which would give the requester some insight into its relationship
with the peer.
Should a peer chose to remove themselves from a session at any time, they may
respond to any query from the coordinator with a DROP message. This message gives
a reason indicating why the peer has terminated its involvement. It may optionally
specify an opt-out duration, so that the initiator does not bother it with subsequent
session requests in the future.
A chunk message requests a specific byte range from the target resource. This
message is passed to a peer who is then expected to either retrieve the data and
pass it back to the coordinator, or respond with a drop request. The response from
the peer indicates the length of the content downloaded, so that the segment can
be properly reordered into the coordinators outgoing buffers.
Since the Twisted framework provides convenient HTTP functionality, we con-
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sidered using it as an underlying mechanism for our peer communication protocol.
We decided that this would in fact be the proper protocol to use, as it is relatively
lightweight, but still powerful and verbose enough to articulate the needs of each
peer during any arbitrary interaction. HTTP allows for non-standard headers to be
included. Any subset of ASCII characters can be included as a header name, which
would allow us to encode any information into the headers.
We realized that when working for a coordinating router, peers act in an isolated
request/response manner, rather then a persistent open stream that need not follow
the request implies response architecture. Since the coordinating router is in charge
of dispatching work for particular file portions to each peer, the involved peer only
needs to know two things: what to get, and where to get it from. With HTTP, we
were able to separate each request that a coordinator would send to a peer, and map
it to its own URL. The outcome is a lightweight API running on each peer. Each
message type is bound to a URL that the peer listens to. It fetches the resource (if
one is requested) for the coordinator and pipes the response back over a persistent
TCP connection opened up when the coordinator requests the /INIT URL. This
connection can be closed by requesting the /DROP URL. The HTTP implementation
allows for the interactions with each peer to be very clear and well known. The
URL format follows that of [protocol]://[IP]:[port]/[REQUEST TYPE].
3.6.2 Role of the Coordinating Router
Since the involved peers act as stateless worker drones, preforming the bare minimum
work required per request (fetching the target resource), it is left up to the initiating
router (known as the coordinator) to manage reassembling the data and pipelining it
back to the client. The very first responsibility of the coordinator is to decide when
aggregation is necessary. The sheer volume of HTTP requests required to load a
typical webpage in today’s modern web, is a double digit number. Each associated
resource is relatively small, and can be downloaded effectively using traditional
methods. Keeping in mind that the startup overhead of our protocol can sometimes
outweigh the time it would take to download a small resource conventionally, the
coordinator will pass on aggregation opportunities for file sizes under a set threshold.
All the coordinator needs to do in this regard, is inspect the content-length of the
returned resource, and compare it against the minimum aggregation threshold.
If the peer is fortunate enough to have many neighbors willing to contribute to
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an aggregation session, it may fine pick a subset of them for optimal performance.
To make an informed decision, the coordinator must maintain transaction records
for a given peer. These records are updated after each session with a peer, and
include information about timeouts and disconnects, as well as the validity of the
data. From these records, the coordinator can infer if a candidate peer is likely to
disconnect or deliver false content.
In order to be certain that each peer is in fact sending back truthful data, the
coordinator must verify a small subsection of each request with the actual resource.
This would be done by concurrently issuing a request for a small range of bytes
from within the dispatched request, and comparing it against the response from the
peer. This introduces a number of caveats when dynamic content comes into play.
There are a variety of factors that could influence false verification. The server its
self could lie, or send back updated content, or a CDN could send cached content
older then the original request. An accusation of lying is a time consuming process.
The coordinator also handles dividing the request into appropriately sized chunks,
and distributing them to both its self and peers in a round robin fashion. To do
this, the request size is examined, and an appropriate static range size is determined
(based off of buffer availability of the platform, and the size of the request). A queue
of totalsize
chunksize
chunks are created. Each time a peer (or the coordinator its self) is ready
to retrieve more content, a chunk range is popped off the queue. Chunks that are
never retrieved are inserted back on the head of this queue, so they can be made
up immediately. Additionally, the coordinator has to buffer chunks returned by its
peers, and transmit them in the correct order back to the client.
Finally, each coordinator is responsible for downloading portions of the file as
well. It must first modify the response headers given back by the first segment, so
that the client sees it as a full request (instead of a partial-content response).
Pycrypto, a Python cryptography library, can be used to generate and store
public/private key pairs to be used with the RSA system. These key objects can
be exported/imported to/from a file, allowing the keys to be passed between nodes.
Each participating node holds a mapping between neighbor IP addresses and public
keys. This is indexed whenever a request from a peer router comes in. Their
corresponding public key is loaded in from the table and used to verify the message’s
signature. This signature is produced by the initiating peer in the following manner.
First, the URL of the target resource is hashed using the MD5 algorithm. The hash
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is then signed with the senders private key. As long as the private key has not been
compromised, the signature can act as non-repudiative proof of origin.
In the case that a participant’s private key has been compromised, then poten-
tially anyone could have signed the message. To counteract this, a third router
(separate from the sender and receiver) is involved. This router acts as a notariz-
ing agent, who adds a timestamp to the original signature, and encrypts the newly
combined message with its own private key. This is sent back to the sender, who
finally forwards it to the receiver, along with the necessary information to decrypt
it (namely, the IP of the notarizing router).
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4 Evaluation
We conducted an initial evaluation of our prototype on virtualized Linux machines.
A physical evaluation was later performed using real hardware. Our network setup
is modeled after that of a small apartment complex, in which each resident’s router
is assigned a limited bandwidth by their ISP, but can communicate with neigh-
bors in its subnet relatively quickly. Playing the role of an ISP, we capped the
downlink bandwidth on each device using a Unix command geared towards traffic
control (aptly named tc). Each VM was outfitted with a number of network in-
terfaces (NICs) in order to logically divide the communication channels that were
in use. This allowed us to make isolated changes to one interface without affecting
networking performance for the entire machine.
Each router has two network interfaces, one for communicating with each other,
and one for communicating with the server. We outfitted a VM with Apache Web
server in order to emulate a typical server. Unix’s powerful traffic shaping utility,
tc, comes with robust queuing functionality which allows upload limits to be en-
forced very deterministically. However, shaping download bandwidth rates proved
problematic and performed too unpredictably for a suitable evaluation environment.
Bandwidth limiting (in a vane similar to that of a typical ISP) was achieved by ap-
plying upload rate rules to each client that contacts the server. A static configuration
allowed each router VM to have a separate tc queue on the server with an associated
outgoing bandwidth limit. Each router communicates with each other over another
network interface, which emulates a local wireless connection (between apartment
rooms). These interfaces can further be rate limited in order to better represent the
wireless bandwidth of a typical 802.11 a/b/g router. For our tests, we chose to limit
these connections to 54mbps, as it is closer to the bandwidth that the typical home
router of today provides.
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Figure 2: Our virtualized test suite
Initial evaluation results were promising. Our baseline case consisted of two
routers, each with a 10mbps throttled connection to the server, and an unthrot-
tled (near instantaneous) connection with each other and their clients. Using a 40
Megabyte test file, downloaded in 1 Megabyte chunks, the total download speed (re-
alized by the client) was close to being doubled, at 18mbps. A significantly smaller
test file of 7mb yielded speeds of 17.3mbps, suggesting that the small overhead
induced by our aggregation techniques is diminished with larger file sizes. After ex-
tensive testing in our controlled virtualized environment, we found that the realized
bandwidth of the client converged towards 90% of the combined offered bandwidth
of each router.
4.1 Effect of Chunk Size on Realized Bandwidth
Our algorithm for aggregating bandwidth works by segmentally downloading a tar-
get file in consecutive chunks of a fixed size. As the size of the chunk (relative to that
of the file) directly determines the number of requests which must be sent to the
server (then processed by the proxy), we sought to find a desirable chunk size which
would accrue as little overhead as possible. Since our target environment (embedded
Linux systems) have limited memory, we chose an upper bound of 32mb, as larger
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chunk sizes would quickly exhaust buffer space. Bandwidth gains increased loga-
rithmically with respect to chunk size. However, gains actually shrank considerably
when using chunk sizes larger then 5mb.
Figure 3: Average bandwidth with respect to chunk size. Three routers were used,
with their server connections fixed at 10mbps
On the opposite end of this spectrum, lies the invariably smaller chunk sizes (of
less then 100kb). We found that chunk sizes below this limit yielded poor download
times. The minimum test chunk size used was 1kb, which produced results far
less then the offered bandwidth of a single router, even when multiple routers were
used in aggregation. For this chunk size, the realized bandwidth was a tenth of a
percent of the offered bandwidth from the pool. Using 10kb, the overheads were
less pronounced, at 21.5% of the offered bandwidth. Using 100kb chunks produced
a combined bandwidth that was 75% of the theoretical offered bandwidth of the
participating routers.
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Figure 4: Growing bandwidth for smaller chunk sizes.
Further investigation of the lower chunk ranges showed a steep logarithmic raise
as chunk sizes grew from 1kb to 1mb. Increasing the chunk size past 1mb garners
only fractional throughput gains, and presents a greater risk to buffer bloat. Chunk
sizes less then 60kb did not perform better then a single router would have without
involving peers. After 80kb, the observed bandwidth began to grow, showing sub-
stantial gains, up until the megabyte chunk range, where it leveled off (as illustrated
in Figure 4.1). For this, we concluded that a lower bound on chunk size of 100kb
was necessary in order for aggregation to become practical, and note that optimal
sizes range between 400kb and 1mb.
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4.2 Real World Tests
After gathering conclusive data through our virtualized test suite, we conducted
a brief proof of concept test using real hardware. We ran Ubuntuu 12.04 desktop
on two PCs, each equipped with USB Wireless NICs. These dongles allowed us
to create wireless inter-router communication, so that our real world tests came as
close to replicating the router environment as possible. Since we were limited to
only two machines, each computer had to take on a double roll in the tests. Each
acted as a router. One doubled as a client, the other doubled as our server. The
latter ran a local instance of Apache Web server, and used a special module to rate
limit connections from each client to a specified throughput. This allowed us to
enforce per-connection bandwidth constraints.
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5 Discussion
Devising a proper approach to bandwidth aggregation at the application layer spurs
a plethora of discussions, some of which are unique in scope to this paper. As far
as these authors know, no existing works in the field of bandwidth aggregation take
the issue of security as seriously as this MQP attempts to do. This is partly due
to the OSI layer in which our aggregation protocol operates (the application layer).
Solutions which operate at lower levels of the protocol stack only have to worry about
optimizing the routing of transport and network layer segments. Our software makes
application layer decisions based off of the nature of the resource being requested,
allowing every router to snoop on the traffic that it helps its peers download. The
implications of the inherent man in the middle nature of our software, are discussed
in the coming sections.
5.1 Rationale for various Design decisions (and their alter-
natives)
We identified a number of key design points involved with our software. This sections
attempts to highlight both the naive and optimal way of approaching many of our
design problems. We note that the finished software implements the former in most
cases, but could be extended to achieve the optimal approach for each design case.
5.1.1 Packet Segmentation Algorithm
We first devised a na¨ıve approach to splitting up the work for a particular file, which
works as follows. Given a peer network of n routers, give each router: FILESIZE
n
.
However, different routers download at different rates, so the file download is not
complete until the slowest router has downloaded and transmitted its chunk back
to the host. The effective download time becomes a function of the download speed
of the slowest router. A better approach is to divide up the file into chunks using a
relation between individual router bandwidth and total pool bandwidth.
A consideration to keep in mind is that the host router may not be directly
connected to each available peer, and certain peers may be connected to each other
better then the host router. It could be the case that the host has 3 peers, who
each have 3 other peers in wireless communication range. When the router splits up
these chunks, the advertised bandwidth of a router that he is directly connected too
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should reflect the average bandwidth of all of that routers peers. So if A connects
to B, who has 2mbps of bandwidth, but B can talk to C and D, who each have a
10mbps connection, B could advertise to A that his bandwidth is
B + C + D
3
mbps
. This will help A more accurately decide how to manage the file segmenting. When
B is passed this chunk, it can do the same with each peer in his network. However,
this only works to a certain degree,
The problem of overlapping neighbors does immediately become an issue. This
would be addressed at the implementation level. The host could generate a random
session key, and pass the key along when it communicates with its neighbors during
the negotiation period. Each neighbor will store this key, and until a cancel request
is sent from the host, the router will reject any negotiating requests whose key
matches their stored key. This way, a router will not commit its bandwidth too two
different neighbors on the same file download.
Pseudo code of the algorithm:
for all peer in neighbors(host) do
netBandwidth← netBandwidth + peer.bandwidth
end for
for all peer in neighbors(host) do
Chunkpeer ← peer.bandwidthnetBandwidth × fileSize
end for
for all peer in neighbors(host) do Delegate Chunkpeer
AmountRemaining ← AmountRemaining − Chunkpeer
end for
Issue HTTP GET for AmountRemaining
5.1.2 Boundaries on segment size
There are a number of pitfalls that this type of segmentation produces. When a
file is downloaded in one session under normal conditions, the round trip time for
the request (reaching the server, getting the first response) has a negligible impact.
As TCP’s AIMD pattern begins, an appropriate window size is established and
transmission time smooths out. Fortunately, the TCP overhead can be amortized
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because HTTP 1.1 uses persistent TCP connections, so the setup only has to happen
once for each peer, just as with a normal download.
The round trip delay (RTT), while negligible for single session downloads, presents
an issue when the download is broken into segments. The RTT overhead is applied
to each segment request, for each peer. This gives the following relation:
Overhead =
filesize
segmentsize
∗RTT
The overhead grows as segment size decreases, so a larger segment is desirable. This
presents a problem for devices with limited buffer space. For example, a typical
home router will have anywhere between 1 and 32MB of buffer space to spare. This
is because the router has to buffer the request data in RAM, where its firmware (pre-
sumably OpenWRT, as well as our program) also resides. To use all the available
buffer would exhaust buffer space, leaving it with little room for other applications
and ultimately leading to congestion at the link. As such, a fraction of the buffers
total space should be used. Clearly, we need to optimize for lower buffer consump-
tion. This means that each router can only download a set amount at a time, and
must wait until the client is ready to request more. This idle time should also be
considered. Fortunately, the overhead is outweighed by the gains of downloading in
parallel, especially when multiple other peers are involved.
In our implementation, we used the na¨ıve approach, and aimed for smaller chunk
sizes, that could be held in a queue on the coordinating router without using an
excessive amount of RAM. One might imagine a target resource as an array of
contiguous, fixed length chunks, which are allocated to peer helpers on a first come,
first served basis. These chunks are written back to the client, in order, as they
come in.
5.2 Security Goals
The biggest problem with our approach to bandwidth aggregation, is that it puts
the end client in control. Our chief concerns are data integrity and download liabil-
ity. The former can be achieved through an implementation of the zero knowledge
protocol, the latter is addressed with a digital signature exchange, using asymmet-
ric cryptography. In addition, the goals of availability and confidentiality will be
considered. Availability is by far the most important factor, as a disabled router
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will certainly lead to quality of service concerns on the client end. Confidentiality
is certainly desirable, but difficult to achieve in our case, as the operator of a peer’s
router has the right and power to view any traffic allocated to it. From a security
standpoint, any peer can be thought of as a required man in the middle, who’s
presence must be tolerated for the sake of the aggregation.
The easiest scenario to envision for accessibility issues is that of a denial of
service, instigated by a peer. If a peer could simply demand bandwidth from its
neighbors endlessly until they were no longer capable of serving their own clients,
then accessibility is certainly breached. For this reason, peer routers volunteer at
will to join aggregation sessions. If a client on a peer’s network suddenly demands
more bandwidth, the peer may opt out of the session, and the initiating router will
react accordingly. The routers will listen on a shared TCP port, which any peer
may close themselves if they wish to opt out of bandwidth aggregation (in either
direction).
Blindly accepting file data from a peer router would certainly be a huge security
hole. As the data being sent back to the client is stored directly to their hard disk
(presumably with the pretense of being accessed very soon) a corrupted or perni-
cious file in the guise of meaningful content could cause havoc on the compromised
computer. In cryptography, the Zero Knowledge Proof [20] is a technique in which
two parties, a prover and a verifier, exchange and verify the truth of a piece of data
without the use of external information. In the case of this MQP, the coordinator
(the verifier) must check segment data coming back from each peer (the prover) for
validity. To do so, the coordinator will choose a random section of bytes within
the range of the segment range it asked the peer for. When the peer responds, it
will check the response against the verify bytes that it downloaded its self, rejecting
the response if the bytes do not match. A malicious peer has no way of knowing
which segment the coordinator will check, so the possibility of being caught out-
weighs the small probability that the attacker correctly guesses the piece that the
verifier will choose2. The peer has no choice but to send the legitimate segment.
This is both a secure and easy to implement solution, with only a small degree of
additional overhead. The RTT for each segment is now doubled, as two requests
must be made to the server, but these requests would reuse the TCP connection
2With a segment size of 1000 bytes, and a verification size of 4 consecutive bytes, the probability
of both the verifier and prover choosing the same sequence is 2.006× 10−9, which is small enough
to be considered secure
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already established with the server for normal chunk downloads, which mitigates the
impact of the overhead. The overhead is certainly a concern, but can be alleviated
by decreasing the rate of verification as peers become more trusted. The coordinator
could dynamically back of and only check a few times per session. The potentially
malicious peer still has no way of knowing if the coordinator will verify any given
transaction, so the zero knowledge principle can be assumed here as well.
While our application of the Zero Knowledge protocol works well in theory, it
makes two dangerous assumptions, namely, that the content being verified is static
(at least within the window of verification), and that the server is truthful. The for-
mer issue may be overlooked, when one assumes that most large file downloads are
static. But this assumption limits the application of our software to resources con-
forming to this type, a facetious endeavor by all accounts. Internet video streaming
is a paragon of dynamic web content. Streaming sites, such as Netflix, determine
an optimal video quality for each session, in a similar way to TCP’s congestion
control. This means that content downloaded before a quality increase is helpless
to be verified after one. Now, we have an added level of complexity to the seem-
ingly straightforward verification process given by the Zero Knowledge proof. To
complicate things even more, we may consider the case where the host server is
untruthful. Suppose the server is asked for byte range 200 through 205, but really
returns bytes 205 through 210. The verifier would again mistakingly incriminate the
prover, when in fact, the server had been the cause of error. For these reasons, the
verifier can at best only speculate the truthfulness of the prover. To ensure greater
accuracy when verifying peer requested content, a more elaborate approach would
be required. The increasing complexity behind properly verifying dynamic content
introduces a processing overhead which can only be endured oﬄine. The result of
these post mortus evaluations would contribute towards an expanding trust factor
for the peer in question, helping to mitigate future offenses.
5.2.1 Trust Platform, and Reliability
Trust is fuzzy since trust is imprecise and vague. Trust is dynamic
since it is not stable and it changes as time goes by. Trust is also
complex since different ways are possible for determining trust. [21]
For the sake of this MQP, we define trust as follows. Trust is a quantified belief
held by a peer, which is formed through the observations and recommendations,
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with respect to another peers ability to complete a particular task successfully.
It is important in our aggregation model, that participating routers have a well-
founded trust established between each other. For example, a peer who is caught
sending virulent data should be subject to significantly more skepticism then a
peer who has no violations. Similarly, a peer may not wish to involve its self in
a session that an untrusted neighbor is initiating. A security trust relationship is
needed, and it must be dynamic and responsive. Selecting peers with desirable
resources (bandwidth) and trust can be achieved in a variety of ways. While in
certain scenarios, a trusted third party could alleviate some or all of the pressure
involving trust calculations, we are unable to make use of it. The trust model must
be dynamic and self regulating. A reputation based model could be used, where
peers seek information about the quality of past experiences other peers have had
with a untrusted peer, evolving into a semi-complex who-trusts-who social network.
All of these demands are present in the peer-to-peer (P2P) network model. We
looked to this field for answers and insights into how we might go about developing a
trust model for our protocol. As it turns out, this is an open area of research in P2P,
so there was a great collection of data to check over. One such model employs data-
signing in order to verify how credible data coming back is. Peers who have more
valid data-signatures are deemed more trust-worthy. This is a popular approach
to trust in file sharing P2P applications. In larger P2P networks, a single client
cannot possibly interact with every other node itself in order to evaluate trust. This
puts forth the need for a reputation based trust model, where a peer evaluates the
trust level of another peer through the claims of other peers who have interacted
with the peer in question. Xiong et al. identify a number of other concerning
characteristics of the reputation model. For instance, if the feedback mechanism is
not incentivized, then a peer being asked for information regarding its experience
with another peer may simply lie, and poison the asker’s understanding of the peer
in question. A peer may also discreetly raise and lower trust by preforming many
small transactions truthfully, in order to build sufficient trust to be involved in a
larger session, which it may then lie about (a sting operation) [22].
Xiong et al. introduce an elaborate approach that attempts to fix most of the
outlined problems with a reputation based model. This includes feedback scope,
which adds a context to the feedback (was the interaction trivial or monumental),
as well as credibility factor for each peer, which is used to asses the trustworthiness
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of a feedback provider [22]. For our application, the reputation model may not
be necessary. In the practical sense of our application, there will likely be a small
number of peer nodes in a single wireless bandwidth pool. Further, since each
peer is within a somewhat close proximity, and each peer is maintained by a real
individual (the router owner), it is less likely that either a peer or its owner will never
interact with another peer. However, if we assume a more optimistic level of adoption
(where every router on an entire city block runs our proxy), then a strong reputation
model again monumental. Where we to do one, it would likely work as follows: at
the end of an aggregation session, the coordinating peer would broadcast its peer
feedback report to all peers involved in the session, so participants would gain a
better understanding of other participants who they were not directly involved with.
The benefit here is that a malicious peer can be identified immediately. However,
the downside is that the coordinating peer has too much power. It can easily lie
about any interaction it had.
Accumulating trust through record keeping is a reliable method, but falls short
because due to its slow start methodology [23].Our bandwidth aggregation schema
is more static, in that neighboring peers who involve themselves are likely to be
in a relationship for a long time. A real world example to relate would be that of
a new neighbor moving into an apartment complex. Suppose that some or all of
the residents in this complex are using the bandwidth aggregation model described
herein. If the new neighbor wishes to join in, the other routers will at first be wary,
possibly choosing to include him in only a subset of interactions. But once trust
has been built, it will pervade until the peer performs a malicious action, or the
peer router’s owner moves away. Since new nodes are not continuously swapped
in and out on a daily basis, a local trust model should suffice for our application.
However, this slow start trust accumulation could be averted if the operators of
the participating routers already have a firm mutual trust with each other. This
hinges on the climate in which our protocol is deployed, as no assumptions about
the connections between operators can be made.
These trust calculations can be modeled mathematically. One approach, sug-
gested by Medic et al., is to represent a peer’s trust factor as a tuple of Trust and
Untrust. Mathematically F = [T, U ], where T = Trust, and U = Untrust. The
benefit of this model is that differing weights can be assigned to each trust factor
component. A weighted average could be simulated, if T = Trust ∗ TrustWeight
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and U = Untrust ∗ UntrustWeight.
In our protocol, it may be the case that a peer who misbehaves in the past
corrects themselves for all future interactions. In such a case, their past violation
should only count as a minor offense, and not hurt their trust factor for the rest of
their existence. This desire suggests a weighted average of each trust factor, between
past and recent interactions. Past interactions would be weighed less heavily when
computing a peer’s trust factor, whereas recent interactions (within the past 12
hours) would be assigned a heavier weight. This allows for a peer’s trust to evolve
with their actions, and scale off better recent behavior. Each trust value will be
within the interval of [0,1].
Leveraging Xiong et al.’s approach to trust computation, we chose to store trust
on a transaction level. Here, a transaction represents one download session held
between a coordinator and a peer. The transaction will hold the computed trust
factor for that session. Ideally, the value will be [1,0]. However, if the peer made
any untrustworthy actions, the second value (untrust) will be higher, resulting in a
lower trust value. The trust factor metric is computed by the summation of each of
these transactions (with a higher weight assigned to more recent transactions, good
or bad). In their PeerTrust model, Xiong et al. model feedback that the coordinator
has with peer u from transaction i as S(u, i). We will use this normalized amount of
satisfaction for the formation of our trust factor score. Note that I(u) denotes the
number of transactions the coordinator has had with peer u, W (u, i) denotes the
weight assigned to the feedback the coordinator has had with peer u at transaction
i (based off the time of transaction), and R(u, i) denotes the untrust feedback from
transaction i with peer u. With this information, T (u) (trust) and U(u) (untrust)
are calculated as follows:
T (u) =
I(u)∑
i=1
S(u, i) ∗W (u, i)
I(u)
, U(u) =
I(u)∑
i=1
S(u, i) ∗W (u, i)
I(u)
Once the metric has been computed, the trust making logic is fairly simple. If
T (u) > U(u), then the peer is trustworthy. If not, the peer cannot be trusted. Since
trust is just one of the many metrics that will go into peer selection, simply assessing
trust on a binary level is sufficient.
Given this formula for averaging trust, we still must add one more vital compo-
nent before a score can be derived, the trust value. In examining multiple papers
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on P2P trust analysis, we found a number of terms and considerations that need
be introduced. With unforgeable identities (in our case, private keys generated by
a trusted central source), it should be difficult for a peer to erase their given iden-
tity (and reputation associated with it) and begin anew with a fresh identity. Such
a peer could use this technique, known as whitewashing, in order to rebuild their
reputation. This is an issue in systems where new peers are trusted from the start.
Stakhanova et al. present a through outline of Trust information, in terms of
what is gathered and how it is scored. The transaction quality can be modeled as
positive, negative, or a combination of both. They note that a versatile model will
consider both, as relying on only negative feedback may lead to wrongful elimination,
while relying on only positive can allow malicious peers to fake benevolence [24].
Trustworthiness can be modeled in multiple ways, where the chosen method is
entirely dependent on the needs of the system. Some P2P systems, such as XREP
and Travos, store trust as a binary value, meaning that the transaction was or was
not satisfactory [25]. The converse approach is to model trust as a discrete value on
the scale of [0,1], allowing for partial trust to be modeled [24]. In many systems, it is
important to record the time of the interaction. This allows recency to be factored
into trust decision making, like giving less weight to older values. Recency allows
past mistakes to be redeemed by continuous good behavior.
Different approaches to transaction storage will yield different trust values. The
memory efficient approach would be to store one average record, and update each
component on a per transaction basis. This has great appeal on devices with low
memory (such as routers), but it sacrifices the elements of recency that help con-
tribute to a more accurate understanding of the peer’s trust. However, storage
requirements in this scenario increase linearly over time as the number of peers in
the system grow.
Stakhanova et al. note that in cases where a few well known peers interact with
each other often, storing trust locally is sufficient for each of them to make decisions.
This obvioulsy doesn’t scale for applications with millions of participants. This
project will adopt the former approach, as the number of involved peers are limited
to a finite local wireless range, which would not typically exceed more then a dozen
peers [24].
How do we compute the actual trust calculation? The smallest scale we can start
on, is at the per-chunk level. Selcuk et al present a solution that uses a bit-vector of
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m interactions. The bits are either 1 or 0, when the data is authentic or inauthentic,
respectively. For our project, each peer has a chance to verify every chunk that is
sent. The bit vector could hold m bits, where m is the number of chunks verified. As
trust grew, m could become smaller and smaller, reducing the verification overhead.
The overal trust from a transaction is computed by treating the m significant bits
in the vector as a signed integer [24].
m− bitvector
2m
Dividing by 2m produces a score on the interval of [0,1). This score can then be
stored in the transaction record, and used in the averaging function mentioned
above. The benefit of the system is that it accumulates a continuous trust value
from many binary transactions. When a file is verified, it either passes verification
or fails. Selcuk et al also provide a formula for calculating the inverse of the trust
value, distrust [26]. The method is the same as with trust, except that the m-bit
vector is inverted (isolating the failure cases). During a download session, a running
value of the distrust could be kept, so that once a certain threshold is reached, the
malicious peer can be dropped. An isolated distrust value allows us to apply our
own weight to distrust, so that a inauthentic response can be weighed more heavily.
5.2.2 Responsibility with Asymmetric Cryptography
Since bandwidth aggregation is often used as a means to accelerate download speeds
for large files, some considerations regarding these very types of files arise. Large files
can be many things, such as a computer application, a compressed music library,
or video data. All these cases are susceptible to copy right infringement due to
illegal download. This scenario introduces a key problem concerning each peer. If
a client wishes to download copyrighted material illegally, and aggregation is used,
each peer router’s owner is liable for the infringement, not just the client. This is
explained in the legality section of this paper. Since it is impossible for each peer
to asses the legality of a file being downloaded, there is little that a peer can do to
prevent themselves from incriminating their clients (the network owners).
If a peer router maintained a log of each session that it participated in, which
could definitively map each request made back to the coordinating host, then the
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peer could deny their liability in the implication, at least to some extent3. If the log
file could be falsified or changed, then it would not be valuable evidence. Thankfully,
asymmetric cryptography provides a way to map each request back to its originator:
digital signatures. Commonly referred to as public key cryptography, this crypto-
graphic algorithm works by using two keys or signatures to encrypt or decrypt a
piece of data. One key is made public, while the other is kept private. These two
keys are intimately tied to each other. If the private key is used to encrypt a piece
of data, only the associated key can decrypt it. Conversely, if the public key is used
to encrypt, only the private key can decrypt. The former allows a piece of data to
be definitively tied to the owner of the public key that decrypts it. If the decryption
fails, then the message was not encrypted by the owner associated with the public
key. In the latter situation, when the public key is used to encrypt, then only the
owner of the associated private key may decrypt, so one and only one person can
read the data.
Implementing a fair non-repudiation protocol usually requires the presence of
a trusted third party (TTP) [27]. It’s involvement can range from frequent to
sparing, being required for every request, or less then once per session. The extra
communication and computational overhead caused by a TTP are hard to ignore. Its
involvement can introduce a bottle neck in communication, and its trustworthiness
is difficult to calculate [19]. A TTP that involves its self in every interaction between
Alice and Bob for a given message exchange is said to be inline. An online TTP only
has to intervene a single time per exchange, avoiding unnecessary communication.
A TTP is said to be oﬄine if its involvement in a session is conditional [19]. An
overview of some notable TTP based non-repudiation protocol proposals follows.
Zhang et al. devised a system in which the TTP broadcasts session information
assigned to each message exchange to a publicly accessible board or web page [27].
In our scope, the TTP could be any other router, and it could publish the session
information to a central server which stores the information. The downside is that
the records must be stored indefinitely, so the disk space will grow indefinitely [28].
Zhou et al. propose a non-repudiation protocol which uses an online TTP to
complete the non-repudiation process. The message exchanged between Alice and
Bob is split into two parts; a key K, generated by Alice which is sent to the third
party, and a commitment C (produced by encrypting a message M with K). The
3As no such case of copyright infringement by one party using multiple routers has occurred,
there is no precedent to cite, so the outcome of such a trial is difficult to predict.
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protocol begins with Alice generating K and a session label L. The non-repudiation
or origin and receipt messages are produced by signing a concatenation of the re-
ceiving router’s IP, L, and C with the senders private key. She then sends her non-
repudiation of origin message to Bob, who then replies with his non-repudiation of
receipt message. Bob cannot read M without first retrieving K from the TTP. Alice
then sends K,L,and the IP of Bob, encrypted with her private key, to the TTP. The
TTP decrypts this 3-tuple and logs the information to a publicly accessible place,
affirming Alice’s proof of submission of K. Next, both Alice and Bob request a
confirmation of K. This is the combination of both Alice and Bobs IPs, K, and L,
encrypted with the TTP’s private key. Alice simply logs this information, and Bob
uses the retrieved key K to finally decrypt the original commitment C, producing
the message M [27].
In this case, when Alice attempts to dispute sending a message to Bob, Bob
will be able to prove she is lying, provided he has the information from above. A
judge would have to examine the confirmation of K sent by the TTP, as well as the
non-repudiation of origin message originally sent to Bob by Alice. The one case that
this fails is when Alice claims that her key was compromised, and that the signature
on all of her messages was used by someone else [27].
The integrity of the key pairs used for signing and verifying a message is of
utmost importance. If a key is compromised, a non-repudiation protocol must be
able to determine whether a signature was generated before or after they key was
compromised. The straightforward approach would have Alice and Bob include
a timestamp in their exchange, acting as evidence of the date of the interaction.
Booth points out the issues with traditional public key encryption when used with
time-stamps for non-repudiation.
if A’s secret key is suspect, it makes no sense to rely upon a timestamp
which has been included in a message whose authenticity is attested to
by that key. Any malicious agent (possibly B or even A himself) could
easily concoct, timestamp, and sign such a message at any time after the
supposed compromise and no one would be the wiser. [29]
Booth proposes a TTP who acts as a notarizing agent [29]. The TTP, acting as
an authenticator, will append their copy of the sender’s public key to the message,
and sign it with their own. This practice is similar to that of a Notary-Public.
Popek et al. proposed a similar system which also incorporates timestamps into
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the notarizing agent’s contribution. Here, Alice first sends her signed message to
a notary TTP who adds a timestamp and then encrypts the message with their
own signature. Alice appends the relevant information (about the Notary whose
private key was used to encrypt the message), and sends it to Bob [30]. They point
out that while using a single TTP as a notary adds substantial resilience to denial
arising from compromised keys, the system can be exponentially enhanced with the
addition of more notaries for each request.
In the case of a compromised or revoked key, the time-stamp of a particular
exchange must simply be compared to the date of revocation in order to verify
whether the signing key was strictly private at the time of the interaction. We
could modify the fair non-repudiation protocol devised by Zhou et al. to include
this measure. The TTP could time stamp each interaction it coordinates, storing
the time T along with the session key and commitment message. When Alice and
Bob retrieve the key for their own purposes, T would be included so that all parties
have a copy of the time stamp. In situations where a dispute arises, the Judge can
simply compare the timestamp to the last known instance of the compromised key’s
validity.
For our protocol, every peer could distribute their public key to each neighboring
peer. The RSA cryptosystem could then be used for signing and verifying the
message data. The sending peer would hash the original message, then sign the hash
using their private key, and the RSA encryption method, and attach the computed
hash as a HTTP header in the request. Each peer who receives the request simply
has to match the sender’s IP to their public key, and use it to verify the signature.
This signature information could be logged to a file, along with IP, time stamp,
port, and URL requested and used in all subsequent HTTP headers, so that the
originators identity is preserved. The pycrypto library provides all the necessary
functions to accomplish this.
For a trial prototype, storing a text file of the IP to public key mapping is
sufficient. For full scale deployment however, this fails to suffice.
5.2.3 Peer selection by a variety of metrics
So far, we have discussed a few ways to evaluate and choose between peers. The
decision is not one to one, a coordinator must asses a given peer by a variety of
metrics. These include estimated bandwidth, connection strength/reliability, and
46
trust factor. But there exists a balance between speed and security. Certainly,
a peer that is well trusted and has a high estimated bandwidth would be a good
candidate for an aggregation session, but the two factors might not always balance.
The coordinating peer must decide between a fast peer who is untrusted, and a
slow peer who is well trusted. Although the goal of bandwidth aggregation is speed,
we cannot ignore the inherent need for a secure system. So in the aforementioned
scenario, an untrusted peer would not be picked.
Reliability is another factor that will influence peer selection. Peers will be
monitored for timeouts. If a peer fails to response to a resource request within a
dynamically computed threshold (expressed as a worst case download time), the
peer will be dropped for the session. After the session is ended, the number of
timeouts the coordinator experienced with that peer will be recorded.
Network reliability is not a new field. There are a plethora of metrics we could
use for our evaluation, but we are only concerned with a small subset of them. A
“reliable” peer is one that transmits correct data in a quick and responsive manner.
The first of these is channel capacity, a measurement of the number of bits that can
be transmitted across a channel in a unit of time. This roughly corresponds to bits
per second.
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6 Related Work
AT&T Mobility li LLC holds a patent that applies similar strategies used in this
MQP to aggregate WWAN clients who each have a static bandwidth allowance that
is rarely in use. At a high level, the patent discusses a strikingly similar approach
as this MQP, but is expressed strictly in terms of WWAN. Since this project aims
to aggregate WLAN bandwidth, it is not a realization of the invention defined in
patent no US7720098 B1 [31].
Octopus+ is a daemon that allows a computer with multiple means of accessing
the Internet to dynamically combine the potential links to increase speed. This is
most likely a round robin approach between the same Internet connections, and the
product doesn’t do any request splitting. It does gracefully handle link failures and
selects the best link for each packet.
There are also a number of commercial services that aim to bring bandwidth ag-
gregation to the home. Multipath Networks offers an all in one aggregating router
which uses Multipath TCP. They have a cloud infrastructure which handles reorder-
ing and aggregate traffic between any WiFi, 3G, or 4G link. Telefonica, a Brazilian
broadband and telecommunications provider, has been researching and developing a
wireless aggregation solution, BeWifi, which claims to double bandwidth speeds for
its customers. They follow a peer-to-peer philosophy, and construct a mesh network
of cooperating routers in close proximity. Sleeping routers contribute their unused
bandwidth to demanding neighbors, allowing potential bandwidth to be highly uti-
lized at all times. Currently, they require a modified router to be installed by a
technician, but hope to one day deploy a plug and play software upgrade. As this
is a closely guarded commercial implementation, their research on the matter is all
private. They note that fairness and security are a priority in their software, but
fail to detail any of the underlying mechanism involved. They also fail to outline
any counter measures in place to enforce repudiation between clients.
Many load balancing routers (D-Link DI-LB604, FatPipe XTREME, AstroCom
PowerLink Pro) have been created, targeting both home users and enterprise busi-
nesses. These typically work by combining multiple links into a single one.
48
7 Future work
The software we developed is open sourced and publicly accessible on Github4. We
note that the proxy itself could be extended and improved in a number of ways. For
instance, while the proxy functions well with HTTP traffic, it does not provide any
support for HTTP over TLS/SSL. With the growing prevalence of HTTPS, support
for it in our proxy becomes a necessity.
We further suggest a method to decrease web page load times using our proxy
software. In today’s Internet, a typical web page request has dozens of related
resource dependencies (such as JavaScript libraries, CSS files and static images), all
of which must be fetched before the page can be properly loaded. We can think
of this group of related requests as being chunks of a file, and farm each request
out to neighbors, to download in parallel, as we do with large files already. If the
proxy intercepts the first request for the web page, we can preemptively farm related
requests out to neighbors, and deliver the entire payload at once. This would likely
speed up the overall load time of web pages.
8 Conclusion
Bandwidth aggregation is an actively growing field, with many avenues for future
research, and a growing potential for commercial adoption. Yet with all this promise,
it is of limited accessibility to consumers. Through this MQP, we fill the gap between
research and realization of bandwidth aggregation. We provide an eloquent yet
simple approach to aggregating bandwidth with neighboring routers over WiFi.
From our analysis, we conclude that these methods are effective in combining the
bandwidth offered by multiple wireless routers, retaining nearly 90% of throughput
potential.
4https://github.com/doctorOb/MQP/tree/master/code/proxy
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